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I. INTRODUCTION
A E violent criminals genetically programmed to be criminals, or
is their behavior better explained by environmental factors such
i as family dynamics, psychosocial stressors, or socioeconomic sta-
tus? During the last few years, geneticists have been searching for possi-
ble genetic roots of violent, antisocial behavior, which has led to the
discovery of a number of controversial aggression genes. The past two
years have seen these so-called aggression genes gain increasing attention
from both the scientific and legal communities, as scientists and scholars
consider the implications such genes may have on theories of criminal
defense, punishment, and personal responsibility. The burgeoning scien-
tific evidence of aggression genes poses two interesting and opposite pro-
positions: first, the promise of predicting and preventing future crime
among affected individuals through incapacitation;1 and second, reducing
individual culpability by excusing a perpetrator's responsibility for his
criminal behavior. While "recourse to genetics offers an easy and appar-
ently science-based way to clarify [legal] ambiguities," '2 there is a risk that
society might turn to genetic information as a "quick-fix" way to lower
societal responsibility in dealing with problematic, violent criminals by
either ignoring other potential environmentally-based causal factors or
denouncing rehabilitative punishment.
1. Dorothy Nelkin, After Daubert: The Relevance and Reliability of Genetic Informa-
tion, 15 CARDoZo L. REV. 2119, 2124 (1994). Nelkin discusses a correlation between vio-
lent tendencies and increased serotonin levels in the brain which has been linked to
Chromosome 11, theoretically posing the possibility of predicting those predisposed to vio-
lent behavior, even inutero. Id.
2. Id. at 2127.
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II. THE SEARCH FOR AN AGGRESSION GENE-A NEW
SCIENTIFIC FRONTIER
A. CHALLENGES FACING GENETIC RESEARCH
Efforts to discover potential genetic roots of violent behavior have
been met with both enthusiasm and skepticism. While many in the legal
and scientific communities believe that evidence of genetic causal factors
can and will be used to help those who are predisposed to violence,
others fear that this information will more likely be abused to justify ra-
cism and imposition of unduly severe punishment.3
1. Ciba Symposium
In February 1995, a Symposium on the Genetics of Criminal and Anti-
social Behavior ("Symposium") was held at the Ciba Foundation, an in-
ternational scientific and educational charity, based in London. The
purpose of the Symposium was to examine "some of the newer evidence
on [genetic factors and differences in antisocial behavior] and,... [to]
consider some of the crucial ethical, legal and criminal implications that
stem from those findings." 4 The Symposium was not open to the public,
but the findings and conclusions of the participants were published in Ge-
netics of Criminal and Antisocial Behaviour.5
The Symposium generated considerable controversy and debate, much
of which centered around the fear that genetic explanations of differences
among ethnic groups and between the sexes will be "used to account for
and justify the inferior social status of women and minority ethnic
groups."' 6 Unlike past attempts to offer genetic hypotheses for behavioral
differences, new genetic research seemingly offers explanations that are
no longer simply theoretical. This is because genetic technology has
made enormous strides in the last ten years, making the isolation and
study of individual gene sequences possible.7 Private and public genetic
research have further been bolstered by the founding of the Human Gen-
ome Project, a multinational effort to map and explain the functions of all
100,000 human genes.8
A conference similar to the Ciba Symposium, which was partially
funded by the National Institutes of Health (NIH), was scheduled in
1992, but was canceled due to accusations of racism and eugenic regres-
3. See id. at 2124-27; Roger B. Dworkin, Medical Law and Ethics in the Post-Auton-
omy Age, 68 IND. L.J. 727, 739 (1993).
4. Michael Rutter, Introduction: Concepts of Antisocial Behaviour, of Cause, and of
Genetic Influences, in GENETICS OF CRIMINAL AND ANTISOCIAL BEHAVIOUR 1 (Gregory
R. Bock & Jamie A. Goode eds., 1996).
5. GENE'ICS OF CRIMINAL AND ANTISOCIAL BEHAVIOUR, supra note 4.
6. Joseph S. Alper & Marvin R. Natowicz, The Allure of Genetic Explanations:
Scientists Find Them More Attractive than Social Explanations, BRIT. MED. J., Sept. 19,
1992, at 666.
7. See Michael Kirby, The Human Genome Project-Promise and Problems, 11 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 1, 7-9 (1994).
8. Id. at 7-8.
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sion. The NIH eventually renewed its funding, and the conference, Re-
search in Genetics and Criminal Behavior: Scientific Issues, Social and
Political Implications, was finally held in September 1995 amid denuncia-
tions of racial prejudice. 9 As would be expected, views on the genetics of
criminal behavior span the spectrum. Diana Fishbein, a criminologist
with the U.S. Department of Justice believes that "'there are areas where
we can begin to incorporate biological approaches' to fighting crime and
. . . that medical treatment [for some] violent offenders should be
mandatory."'10 Still, others argue that identifying social problems with
biology simply allows a society to deflect responsibility away from the
state and its social welfare appendages."
During one Symposium presentation, Sir Michael Rutter, a child psy-
chiatrist at the Institute of Psychiatry in London, argued that genetics and
environmental factors are not mutually exclusive in causing violent
propensities. Rutter explained that the genetic research designs
presented and discussed at the Symposium were crucial for the testing of
hypotheses about environmental risk mechanisms as well as for the study
of genetic factors.12 The real importance of research into the existence of
aggression genes, according to Rutter, lies in learning more about their
potential causal processes when coupled with environmental elements,
not solely in the predictive strength of such genes.' 3 This holistic ap-
proach seems to be shared by legal scholars who are attempting to recon-
cile this new evolving science with traditional theories of culpability and
punishment.' 4 Examination into the relationship between genetic and
environmental causal factors of violent behavior, as espoused by Rutter,
is hypothetical at this point since most of the new genetic research is con-
ducted in a "causal vacuum" and does not explore the effects that
psychosocial stressors have on those carrying aggression-causing genes.
2. Fears of Eugenic Masterminding
The danger of modern genetic research, some say, is "like the danger of
the old eugenics, [in that] society will mistakenly believe it proves more
than it does and use it as an excuse to injure further those who are al-
ready disadvantaged.' 5 Despite attempts to neutralize the political fall-
out of both the Symposium and the NIH-sponsored conference, the fact
that scientific knowledge concerning genetics and aggressive criminal be-
9. Natalie Angier, Disputed Meeting to Ask If Crime Has Genetic Roots, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 19, 1995, at C1.
10. Id. (citations omitted).
11. Id. Dr. Dorothy Nelkin of New York University argues that the question of how a
society addresses criminal behavior should not be a scientific issue, but rather a moral
issue. See generally Nelkin, supra note 1, at 2124-27.
12. Rutter, supra note 4, at 8.
13. Id. at 11.
14. Nelkin, supra note 1, at 2125. "The presence of a biological condition should not
be confused with a specific behavioral trait or even a disease. The gene is not a completely
deterministic force, independent of history or environment." Id.
15. Dworkin, supra note 3, at 739.
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havior is so emotionally charged may prevent some people from making a
distinction between scientific and political inquiry.16 The fear that eu-
genic theories, which attempt to validate the genetic dominance or supe-
riority of one race, will resurface is justified. Such fears have strong roots
that can be linked to at least three major historical events: (1) Nazi theo-
ries of genetic determinism in racial difference; (2) Soviet adoption of
Marxist theories of genetic determinism of individual differences; and (3)
the prevailing theory of racial/genetic inferiority of African-Americans
prior to the civil rights movement in the United States.17
Increased knowledge about the genetic underpinnings of aggressive or
violent behavior can potentially lead to the adoption of socially destruc-
tive eugenic theories centered around the idea that it is possible to stock
the genetic pool with "desirable" people. Evidence of this type of eu-
genic abuse is found in the U.S. Supreme Court decision, Buck v. Bell.'8
In Buck, the Court upheld a Virginia law that mandated forced sterili-
zation of "feeble-minded" and criminally inclined individuals. Therefore,
under the Virginia statute, Carrie Buck, the alleged "feeble-minded"
mother of an illegitimate, "feeble-minded" child, who was herself the
daughter of a "feeble-minded" mother, was forced to undergo steriliza-
tion.' 9 Justice Holmes validated this final solution approach when he
stated, "Carrie Buck 'is the probable potential parent of socially inade-
quate offspring' . . . . It would be strange if [the state] could not call upon
those who already sap the strength of the State for these lesser sacrifices
.... Three generations of imbeciles are enough. '20
While history has shown the abuse of individuals based on raw genetic
information, it is important that society not become frozen by fear. Soci-
ety must move responsibly forward with valuable genetic research and
examine both the positive and negative implications it may have on those
who operate and live within the criminal justice system.
B. DISCOVERY OF NEW AGGRESSION-CAUSING GENES AMONG
MICE MODELS
Although geneticists are currently conducting research with the hope
of finding an aggression-causing gene, many scientists believe that there
16. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BioETHics 947 (Warren T. Reich ed., 1995).
17. Id. Theories of racial inferiority still exist today. Some sociologists argue that
there is a genetic basis for an inherent difference between the IQs of various races and that
this difference accounts for a higher incidence of crime among African-Americans because
they lack a consequential understanding of their actions. See generally RICHARD J.
HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE: INTELLIGENCE & CLASS STRUC-
TURE IN AMERICAN LIFE 9-10 (1994).
18. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
19. Id. at 205. The statute provided that the welfare of society would be promoted by
the sterilization of "mental defectives." Id.
20. Id. at 207. Mr. I.P. Whitehead, who argued for Ms. Bell, highlighted the potential
for eugenic abuse when he stated, "A reign of doctors will be inaugurated and in the name
of science new classes will be added, even races may be brought within the scope of such
regulation, and the worst forms of tyranny practiced." Id. at 202.
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may actually be several isolated genetic abnormalities that contribute to
aggressive, violent behavior, as opposed to one single "aggression
gene."'21 In the last couple of years, however, two distinct genetic abnor-
malities studied in mice and humans have gained and maintained a great
deal of scientific and legal attention: the absence of nitric oxide and the
absence of monoamine oxidase A.
1. Efficacy of Mice Models
While research into aggressive behavior among mice began nearly fifty
years ago, molecular genetics has only recently advanced enough to iden-
tify specific genes that effect such complex traits as aggressive behavior.22
Mice are particularly valuable in mapping out the genes for aggression
because mice and humans have many homologous genes mapped to ho-
mologous chromosome regions.23 Because of this similarity, some scien-
tists believe that individual genes identified for mouse aggression may be
developed as animal models for human aggression. 24 Identification of
genes for other behaviorally complex mouse traits has led to the develop-
ment of animal models for parallel human traits such as diabetes and
obesity. 25
2. Nitric Oxide Link to Aggression
Scientists at Johns Hopkins University have found that male mice lack-
ing the gene that produces nitric oxide are highly prone to aggressive,
violent behavior against other mice.26 Nitric oxide is a neuron-produced
gas that is used by the brain as a neurotransmitter allowing neurons to
communicate. The genetically abnormal male mice sexually pursued fe-
male mice for hours even though the female mice were not in heat.27
Normal male mice, on the other hand, will give up the chase when a fe-
male is not in heat. Additionally, normal mice will usually stop an attack
when an opponent surrenders, but abnormal mice were found to fight
other mice to the death, even after the opposing mice surrendered by
lying on their backs.28 Based on this study, it is speculated that nitric
oxide is the neurotransmitter that curbs sexual and aggressive behavior.
"These animals were very, very aggressive-dramatically so," said Dr.
Randy J. Nelson, professor of psychology at Johns Hopkins University
21. See Han G. Brunner, MAOA Deficiency and Abnormal Behavior: Perspectives on
an Association, in GENETICS OF CRIMINAL AND ANTISOCIAL BEHAVIOUR, supra note 4, at
155, 161.
22. Stephen C. Maxson, Issues in the Search for Candidate Genes in Mice as Potential
Animal Models of Human Aggression, in GENETICS OF CRIMINAL AND ANTISOCIAL BEHA-
VIOUR, supra note 4, at 21.
23. Id. at 22.
24. Id
25. Id. at 26.
26. Douglas Birch, Scientists Link Missing Gene in Mice to Violent Behavior; Only





and co-sponsor of the study.29 "They don't seem to recognize social cues
which would normally turn off reckless, impulsive or violent behavior. '30
Speculative treatment models for nitric oxide deficiency are already be-
ing discussed. According to Dr. Solomon H. Snyder, a neurobiologist at
Johns Hopkins University and co-sponsor of the study, examining the
DNA in families with a history of aggression may lead to discovery of a
defect in the "knocked out" gene that enables the brain to produce nitric
oxide. 31 Furthermore, additional research could lead to the development
of new nitric oxide-boosting drugs to treat people genetically predisposed
to aggressive, violent behavior.32 While human studies have yet to be
conducted, the mouse study provides important insight into understand-
ing human aggression due to the neurological similarity between mice
and people. 33
3. The Absence of Monoamine Oxidase A and Aggressive Behavior
Using genetic "knockout" technology, a multinational research team
has developed a family of mice that lack monoamine oxidase A
(MAOA), an enzyme that severely affects the amount of serotonin and
norepinephrine in the brains of affected mice.34 Normal amounts of
MAOA in the brain serve to inactivate production of serotonin, a neuro-
transmitter that influences moods and perception, and norepinephrine, a
neurotransmitter that helps control body movement.35 In the genetically
altered mice, however, MAOA catalytic activity ceased altogether, caus-
ing the production of unusually high levels of serotonin and
norepinephrine, which in turn led to impulsive aggressive behavior.36
Abnormally aggressive behavior was displayed by MAOA-deficient
adult male mice, even though housed in normal rearing conditions from
the time they were pups.37 Researchers found that these male mice re-
peatedly attacked one another, primarily by biting each other on the gen-
itals and the rump.38 The adult males also displayed abnormal sexual
aggression by grasping females repeatedly. 39 Dr. Isabelle Seif, a molecu-
lar biologist who directed a team of MAOA researchers, believes that
since the MAOA-deficient mice displayed abnormal aggression under
normal rearing conditions, absent psychosocial stressors, drugs could be





33. Maxson, supra note 22, at 22.
34. Olivier Cases et al., Aggressive Behavior and Altered Amounts of Brain Serotonin
and Norepinephrine in Mice Lacking MAOA, SCIENCE, June 23, 1995, at 1763.
35. Id.
36. Id. (footnote omitted).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1764.
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MAOA. 40 The absence of psychosocial stressors among the disturbed
mice suggests a very strong genetic link to the abnormal behavior.
C. AGGRESSION-CAUSING GENETIC ABNORMALITIES IN HUMANS
1. Monoamine Oxidase A Deficiency in Humans-Dutch Family Study
A recent study of a large Dutch extended family, which spanned four
generations, found fourteen males exhibiting borderline mental retarda-
tion (IQ of about eighty-five) 41 and impulsive aggressive behavior mani-
fested in acts of verbal and physical aggression, which included arson,
aggravated assault, sexual assault, attempted rape, and exhibitionism. 42
In all of the affected men, MAOA activity was completely absent.4 3 The
Dutch family was selected for the study because a sharp, unexplainable
behavioral contrast between affected and unaffected males had been
noted by family members for years.44
Researchers found that stagnant MAOA activity among affected males
resulted in the excretion of abnormally high amounts of the neurotrans-
mitters serotonin, norepinephrine, dopamine, and epinephrine, all of
which are normally broken down in the body using MAOA.4 5 According
to Xandra Breakefield, a neurogeneticist and collaborator of the Dutch
family study, when these neurotransmitters accumulate in abnormal
amounts due to a defect on the MAOA gene, affected individuals will
have trouble handling stressful situations, causing them to respond exces-
sively and at times, violently.46 While MAOA deficiency suggests a
causal link for increased impulsive, aggressive behavior among male
members of the Dutch family, scientists acknowledge that research is in
the infancy stages and that additional MAOA-deficient families must be
studied in order to test the validity of the causal association.4 7
Because MAOA deficiency is among several tentative genetic abnor-
malities linked with unusually aggressive behavior, Han G. Brunner, a
clinical geneticist and author of the Dutch family study, warns against
viewing the data in a vacuum. 48 While Brunner strongly supports the the-
ory that behavior is influenced by genetic factors, he states that,
[T]he notion of an 'aggression gene' does not make sense, because it
belies the fact that behaviour should and does arise at the highest
level of cortical organization, where individual genes are only dis-
tantly reflected in the anatomical structure, as well as in the various
40. Tim Hilchey, The Aggression Enzyme?, INT'L HERALD TRIB., June 29, 1995, at 1;
see also Cases et al., supra note 34, at 1765.
41. Virginia Morell, Evidence Found for a Possible "Aggression" Gene, SCIENCE, June
18, 1993, at 1722; Brunner, supra note 21, at 156.
42. Brunner, supra note 21, at 156.
43. Id.
44. Morell, supra note 41, at 1722.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1722-23.
47. Brunner, supra note 21, at 162.
48. Id. at 161.
[Vol. 50
AGGRESSION GENES
neurophysiological and biochemical functions of the brain.49
Brunner also believes that genetic studies can be best used to improve
our understanding of how, not why, impulsive aggressive behavior
occurs.
50
The ramifications that the nitric oxide-deficient mouse study, the
MAOA-deficient mouse study, and the Dutch family study will have on
the criminal justice system are far from clear. As scientists continue to
identify behavior-modifying genetic abnormalities that cause increased
aggression and violence, this groundbreaking research will surely have an
impact on sentencing violent criminals.
2. Twin Studies
Many studies of twins have been conducted over the last number of
years in an effort to determine the genetic correlation to criminal or anti-
social behavior. Twin studies have gained popularity among scientists be-
cause twins are raised in a common environment, so that trends among
identical and nonidentical twin sets may be contrasted to illustrate ge-
netic influences on behavior.5' While the researchers of the two studies
discussed below did not attempt to identify a single aggression-causing
gene, they found that genetic factors played a key role in predicting the
incidence of criminal behavior among twins.52 Environmental factors
were not considered.
a. Vietnam Era Veteran Twin Registry
A study involving 3226 pairs of twins, born between 1939 and 1957 and
who served in the military during the Vietnam War, was conducted in
order to determine the incidence of criminality among the twin sets.53
From the data, it was discovered that genetic factors, rather than environ-
mental factors, more strongly influenced the following: (1) whether the
subjects were ever arrested after age fifteen; (2) whether they were ar-
rested more than once after age fifteen; and (3) whether they engaged in
later adult criminal behavior.5 4 While no single gene was identified as the
culprit for twin pair criminal behavior similarity, the scientists. concluded
that genes are highly influential in the occurrence of adult criminal be-
havior among twins by "contributing to dispositions that make a given
individual more or less likely to behave in a criminal manner.155
49. Id.
50. Id. at 162.
51. Michael J. Lyons, A Twin Study of Self-Reported Criminal Behaviour, in GENETICS
OF CRIMINAL AND ANTISOCIAL BEHAVIOUR, supra note 4, at 61.
52. Id. at 68.
53. Id. at 63.
54. Id at 65.
55. Id at 67.
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b. Danish TWin Study
A Danish twin study conducted over the last twenty-five years also
sheds light on the inheritability of criminal-type aggression. Researchers
investigated the criminal records of pairs of nonidentical and identical
twins to compare the concurrence of criminal records among the twins.56
The researchers found that if a male identical twin had a criminal record,
his twin was fifty percent more likely than the average Danish male to
have a criminal record, compared to only a fifteen to thirty percent in-
creased likelihood for nonidentical twins.57 While the twin studies indi-
cate a genetic predisposition to criminal behavior without pinpointing the
specific genes involved, Irving Gottesman, a psychologist who worked on
the study, believes the study shows that "criminals are not born, but the
odds at the moment of birth of becoming one are not even."'58
Clearly, much of the research searching for a genetic predisposition for
criminal behavior to date has produced inconclusive results. Yet, as re-
search into potential "aggression genes" and their links to impulsive, ag-
gressive behavior continues, it is imperative that the impact of such
research on criminal sentencing be anticipated and analyzed.
III. AGGRESSION GENE AS MITIGATING FACTOR
IN SENTENCING
A. STEPHEN MOBLEY CASE
In 1991, during the commission of a robbery at a Georgia pizza store,
Stephen Mobley shot the store manager in the back of the head with a
semi-automatic pistol while the victim was on his knees. Three weeks
after the pizza store incident, Mobley used the same pistol to rob a dry
cleaning store. After the dry cleaning robbery, Mobley threw the pistol
out of his car window when he saw he was being followed by a police car.
Following a high-speed chase, Mobley was apprehended and confessed to
both robberies as well as the murder of the pizza store manager.59 In
1994 Mobley was convicted of malice murder and felony murder. Based
on the aggravating circumstance of armed robbery, the jury recom-
mended the death penalty for the murder, and the trial court subse-
quently sentenced Mobley to death.60
On appeal, Mobley argued that the trial court erred in denying his mo-
tion requesting that the court grant him funds for expert witnesses to con-
duct tests to determine whether he suffered from a genetic deficiency of
monoamine oxidase A, the enzymatic neurotransmitter that predisposed
him to violent, impulsive criminal behavior.61 The request for genetic




59. Mobley v. State, 455 S.E.2d 61, 65 (Ga.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 377 (1995).
60. Id
61. Id. at 65-66.
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testing and admissibility of genetic evidence was based on Mobley's fam-
ily history that contained a record of four generations of violence and
behavioral disorders.62 Mobley planned to use the test results as evi-
dence of a mitigating factor at his sentencing hearing, relying on recent
scientific studies "that suggest a possible genetic basis for violent and im-
pulsive behavior in certain individuals. ' 63 The Georgia Supreme Court
upheld the trial court's denial of the motion on grounds that the "theory
behind the request for funds will not [reach] a scientific stage of verifiable
certainty in the near future and that Mobley could not show that such a
stage will ever be reached." 64
The Mobley case is likely the first of many cases that will attempt to
use genetic testing to prove the existence of an MAOA deficiency in the
defendant. It is interesting to note that although both the trial court and
the Georgia Supreme Court rejected Mobley's genetic factor-based miti-
gation attempt, neither court completely ruled out the possibility of using
the results of genetic testing in the future. The court simply affirmed the
trial court's ruling that in order for genetic evidence to be used as a miti-
gating factor in the sentencing phase of a capital case, the evidence must
reach a "scientific stage of verifiable certainty normally required for the
introduction of scientific evidence. '65 The court's choice of proceeding
with caution seems prudent if juries are going to be required to determine
the relationship between a defendant's mental capacity and the claimed
genetic disorder.
As additional scientific research is conducted on genetic factors such as
MAOA deficiency and as the movement to identify biologically caused
links to violent, aggressive behavior continues to gain momentum, it is
foreseeable that genetic predisposition evidence could reach the required
"scientific stage of verifiable certainty" sooner than some may expect.
One legal scholar believes that "the question is not whether genetic evi-
dence will ever be admitted into court, but when and under what kinds of
circumstances. '66
While progress in genetic understanding continues, the evidentiary
standards for admitting genetic evidence appear to be easing. The United
States Supreme Court, in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. ,67
recently loosened the standards for admitting scientific evidence in fed-
eral court cases, requiring only that the evidence be reliable and rele-
62. See Deborah W. Denno, Legal Implications of Genetics and Crime Research, in
GENETICS OF CRIMINAL AND ANTISOCIAL BEHAVIOUR, supra note 4, at 248, 251.
63. Mobley, 455 S.E.2d at 65-66 (citations omitted); Denno, supra note 62, at 251-52.
At the trial, Mobley introduced into evidence the Dutch family study in which an MAOA
deficiency was found to exist in four generations of males prone to impulsive, violent be-
havior. Denno, supra note 62, at 252; see supra notes 41-50 and accompanying text.
64. Mobley, 455 S.E.2d at 66; see also Harper v. State, 292 S.E.2d 389 (Ga. 1982) (ad-
missibility test depends on whether technique has reached verifiable certainty, not whether
technique is generally accepted in scientific community).
65. Mobley, 455 S.E.2d at 66.
66. Denno, supra note 62, at 249.
67. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
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vant.68 It is likely that state courts will soon follow Daubert. The
Daubert Court acknowledged that the seventy-year-old "general accept-
ance" test had been superseded by the Federal Rules of Evidence:69 "If
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or educa-
tion, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. ' 70 This
decision could have far-reaching implications if genetically based criminal
defenses become more commonplace, since under Daubert, the scientific
evidence must only be relevant and pertain to scientific knowledge-by
definition, a somewhat ambiguous evidentiary standard.7'
Deborah Denno points out that the Mobley court's refusal to allow
genetic testing is at odds with the "increasingly liberal acceptance of bio-
logical and psychological evidence to justify defenses. '72 Specifically,
Denno cites the admission of positron emission tomography (PET) scans
by courts in sentencing.73 While Denno recognizes that evidence of a
genetic abnormality cannot legitimately be used in a vacuum as a sentenc-
ing solution, she suggests it could be utilized as a single mitigating factor
in the same way that other types of biological, psychological, sociological,
and environmental factors are currently considered. 74
B. MITIGATION MANDATES
1. Supreme Court Guidance for Genetic Evidence
The United States Supreme Court has clearly established that during
the sentencing phase of a capital case the sentencer may not refuse to
consider any relevant mitigating evidence. 75 The consideration of miti-
gating factors in death penalty cases was characterized by the Court as
constitutionally mandated when it stated:
[T]he Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sen-
tencer, in all but the rarest kind of capital case, not be precluded
from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's
character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that
the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.76
Underscoring the importance of mitigating factors, the Court in Penry v.
Lynaugh77 stated, "[I]t is precisely because the punishment should be di-
68. Id. at 590-91.
69. Id. at 587.
70. FED. R. EviD. 702.
71. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 598-601 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part).
72. Denno, supra note 62, at 253 (citation omitted).
73. See infra notes 148-51 and accompanying text.
74. Denno, supra note 62, at 254.
75. See Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 394, 399 (1987); see also Lockett v. Ohio,
438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion).
76. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted); see also Woodson
v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303-04 (1976) (character evidence allowed in death pen-
alty case).
77. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
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rectly related to the personal culpability of the defendant that the jury
must be allowed to consider and give effect to mitigating evidence rele-
vant to a defendant's character or record or the circumstances of the
offense." 78
It is clear that the Supreme Court requires evidence of mitigating fac-
tors to be considered during the sentencing phase of certain cases and
that these factors may include evidence of a defendant's background,
character, or circumstances surrounding the crime. What is less clear,
however, is how evidence of a genetic predisposition to criminality can
and will be viewed by courts in the future. As genetic research becomes
more conclusive, it seems foreseeable that in the wake of Mobley, crimi-
nal defendants will claim that evidence of an "aggression gene" is exactly
the type of evidence that a "'sentencer' may not refuse to consider or 'be
precluded from considering' [as] relevant mitigating evidence. '79
2. Reliability of Genetic Information for Use as a Mitigating Factor
While consideration of mitigating factors in criminal cases is an estab-
lished rule of law, the role genetic evidence will play in future criminal
cases is not yet established. In Daubert,80 the Supreme Court held that
judges should assess the scientific validity or reliability underlying scien-
tifically based expert testimony before allowing such evidence to be con-
sidered as a mitigating factor. 81 The Daubert Court established some
loosely defined guarantees of evidentiary scientific reliability that in-
cluded: first, whether the evidence has been tested; second, whether it
has been subjected to peer review and publication; third, whether the
conclusions are derived from a set of standards with a known error rate;
and finally, whether the information is generally accepted in the scientific
community.82
Addressing the use of genetic information as a mitigating factor, Doro-
thy Nelkin suggests that when applying the Daubert standards, the relia-
bility of scientifically tested genetic information depends on three factors:
first, the intrinsic accuracy of the measurements; second, the consistent
result of what is being measured; and third, the ability of the observer to
accurately interpret the results. 83 Using either the Daubert or the Nelkin
standards for scientific reliability, current scientific information regarding
a genetic predisposition to impulsive, aggressive criminal behavior would
fail because the available information is not yet generally accepted in the
78. Id. at 327-28. The Penry jury was not given instructions as to Penry's mental disa-
bility or the definition of "deliberately." The Supreme Court held that such deficiencies
did not clearly direct the jury to fully consider Penry's mitigating evidence. Id. at 327; see
Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604.
79. Hitchcock, 481 U.S. at 394 (citing Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4 (1986)
(quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 114 (1982))).
80. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 579.
81. Id. at 592-95.
82. Id.
83. Nelkin, supra note 1, at 2123.
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scientific community and initial test results have not been replicated to
demonstrate consistent results.
Still, as more information comes to light regarding genetic predisposi-
tions to criminality and "[o]ld themes of biological determinism [become]
prevalent.... empowered by new scientific developments," public sen-
timent may demand that genetic information be used in sentencing deci-
sions. As the fear of criminal violence escalates, Nelkin suggests that it
may be "comforting to believe that there is definitive, science-based in-
formation relevant to understanding and resolving social problems....
Recourse to genetics offers an easy and apparently science-based way to
clarify ambiguities. '85 Growing public sentiment regarding the efficacy
of using genetic information to predict or identify those individuals carry-
ing a violence-causing gene,86 supported by controversial scientific evi-
dence, may ultimately combine to lower the required level of scientific
acceptance, thus rendering genetic information admissible sooner than
expected. After all, "[t]here is no absolute threshold level of certainty
that must be surmounted for an idea to become scientific. '87
It seems that the problem for the legal system may soon shift from
what the new and burgeoning scientific research will show, to the vague
and inconsistent ways the legal system will approach it.88 Unfortunately,
the current culture of fear that exists in America may lead to the Daubert
standards being stretched beyond their protections of certainty, leading
courts and juries to view information of genetic predisposition to violence
as an aggravating factor instead of a mitigating factor.
3. Genetic Predisposition to Mental Illness as a Mitigating Factor
The defendant in Mobley currently stands alone in his attempt to use
evidence of an MAOA deficiency as a mitigating factor during the sen-
tencing phase of punishment. At least one court, however, has held that
in a death penalty case evidence of a defendant's genetic predisposition
to mental illness must be presented as a mitigating factor during sentenc-
ing if the absence of such evidence would result in prejudice. 89 As the
relevant body of research grows regarding neurotransmitters such as
MAOA and nitric oxide and as this research becomes more widely ac-
cepted in the scientific community, Hendricks v. Calderon90 may assist
84. Id. at 2125.
85. Id. at 2126-27.
86. Increasingly, Parents Would Say Yes to Gene Engineering in Womb, BIOTECHNOL-
OGY NEWSWATCH, Nov. 6, 1995, at 1. The author cites a British study in which it was
shown that over a 12-month period the number of people who would find genetic manipu-
lation acceptable to prevent aggressive behavior more than tripled, from 5% to 18%. Id.
87. Bert Black, The Supreme Court's View of Science: Has Daubert Exorcised the Cer-
tainty Demon?, 15 CARDOZO L. REv. 2129, 2129 (1994).
88. See Denno, supra note 62, at 255.
89. See Hendricks v. Calderon, 864 F. Supp. 929, 947 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (upholding con-





courts in how they should view a defendant's genetic predisposition
evidence.
In Hendricks, the defendant, Edgar Hendricks, was convicted of two
counts of first-degree murder and was sentenced to death. On appeal,
Hendricks argued that his trial counsel denied him his Sixth Amendment
right to effective assistance of counsel-by failing to call, during both the
guilt and sentencing phases, two expert witnesses who could offer evi-
dence of mitigating circumstances. 91 The witnesses, Dr. Lisak and Dr.
Dudley, testified during an evidentiary hearing that mental illness is
highly prevalent in Hendricks's extended family and that he was geneti-
cally predisposed and vulnerable to serious mental illness. The doctors
further testified that this genetic predisposition was exacerbated by a vio-
lent and traumatic upbringing that included years of physical, emotional,
and sexual abuse. 92 It is undisputed that had Dr. Dudley been called by
the defense to testify at trial, he would have testified that Hendricks was
genetically predisposed to insanity and thus had diminished capacity at
the time of the killings.93
The court found that while it was reasonable for trial counsel not to call
the doctors to testify as to an insanity defense during the guilt phase,
withholding this potential mitigating evidence of a genetic predisposition
to mental illness and insanity at the sentencing phase was not reasonable
under the circumstances and was prejudicial. 94 Hendricks's trial counsel
did not personally investigate the mental illness mitigating evidence, nor
were reasonable efforts made to locate the witnesses and documents in
order to present this evidence during sentencing. 95
The Supreme Court has held that this type of haphazard approach to
presenting mitigating evidence during the punishment phase is not al-
lowed when dealing with the seriousness of a potential capital sentence.96
Quoting Penry, the Hendricks court reiterated that "the jury must be able
to consider and give effect to any mitigating evidence relevant to a de-
fendant's background, character, or the circumstances of the crime."'97 In
Hendricks's case, evidence of a genetic predisposition to mental illness
would certainly be classified as "relevant to a defendant's character."98
Thus, the court held that Hendricks's trial counsel's failure to offer,
among other things, mitigating evidence of a genetic predisposition to
91. Id. at 931-35. Hendricks relied on the Strickland test for prejudice: "the question
is whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the sentencer ... would
have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not war-
rant death." Id. at 933 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 695 (1984)).
92. Id. at 934-35.
93. Id. at 935.
94. Id at 942-46.
95. Id at 944-45.
96. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 328 (1989); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604
(1978).
97. Hendricks, 864 F. Supp. at 946 (citing Penry, 492 U.S. at 328).
98. Id at 947 (emphasis added).
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mental illness and insanity at the sentencing phase resulted in prejudice.99
Hendricks illustrates that as evidence of the causal effect of aggression
genes to criminal and antisocial behavior becomes more accessible and
scientifically reliable, the combined effect of the Lockett,1' ° Daubert,101
and Strickland'0 2 standards for admissibility of mitigating evidence will
require courts to allow such evidence at the sentencing phase, as well as
recognize the validity of ineffective counsel claims where such evidence is
not offered.
IV. AGGRESSION GENES AND THE THEORIES
OF PUNISHMENT
A. RETRIBUTION
Retributive theories of punishment have long been used to justify im-
position of the death penalty. In Furman v. Georgia,10 3 the Supreme
Court addressed the purpose and efficacy of retributive punishment when
it stated,
The instinct for retribution is part of the nature of man, and channel-
ing that instinct in the administration of criminal justice serves an
important purpose .... When people begin to believe that organized
society is unwilling or unable to impose upon criminal offenders the
punishment they 'deserve,' then there are sown the seeds of
anarchy .... 104
While the death penalty was rejected by the Court in Furman, this lan-
guage was later used by the Court in Gregg v. Georgia0 5 to justify the
reinstatement of capital punishment in Georgia. 10 6
The idea of retribution, or "just deserts," is based on a strong presump-
tion that the offender deserves to be punished in order to restore a bal-
ance to the scales of justice. "Deserve" is defined as "to be worthy, fit, or
suitable for some reward or requital.' 10 7 Thus, in the criminal sentencing
context, a defendant must consciously direct his conduct in such a way
that punishment commensurate to the crime committed is the most suita-
ble way to ensure restoration of the balance of justice. Resort to such
dictionary definitions emphasizes personal responsibility and culpability.
99. Id.
100. See supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text.
101. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
102. See supra note 91.
103. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
104. Id. at 308 (Stewart, J., concurring).
105. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
106. The Gregg Court distinguished between the 1972 death penalty statute applied in
the Furman case and Georgia's revised death penalty statute by showing that the arbitrary
"untrammeled discretion" that violated the Fourteenth Amendment's proscriptions against
cruel and unusual punishment in the earlier statute was ameliorated by a system that "pro-
vides for a bifurcated proceeding at which the sentencing authority is apprised of the infor-
mation relevant to the imposition of sentence and provided with standards to guide its use
of the information." Id. at 195.
107. MERRIAM WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICrIONARY 313 (10th ed. 1993).
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Culpability plays a key role in the elucidation of two important asser-
tions set forth by retributionists.
First, the primary object of criminal sanctions is to punish culpable
behavior. Although punishment may result in certain utilitarian ben-
efits, notably the reduction of criminal behavior, the justification of
punishment does not require such a showing; for it is moral and just
that culpable behavior be punished. Second, the severity of the sanc-
tions visited on the offender should be proportioned to the degree of
his culpability. 10 8
Thus, for retributive punishment to be validly utilized, culpable behavior
must be shown. Criminal "culpability" is defined as requiring "a showing
that [the criminal] acted purposely, knowingly, recklessly or negligently,
as the law may require, with respect to each material element of the of-
fense."' 0 9 When the presence of a possible aggression-causing gene en-
ters the calculation of a criminal defendant's behavior, the issue of
culpability becomes less clear because such genetic evidence may show
that the alleged criminal was acting in accordance with a genetic code and
thus did not have complete control over his behavior.
Evidence of a genetic predisposition may nullify the retributive theory
of punishment for aggressive, violent criminal behavior since such behav-
ior in certain individuals may be the result of biological determinism as
opposed to conscious, choice-based decision making. Scientists, however,
warn against viewing behavior-causing factors in isolation. Defending his
theory of how genetic factors influence violent behavior, Jonathan Glover
contends that the combined effect of genes, neurodevelopmental, and en-
vironmental factors account for behavioral determinism.1 0 This theory
of determinism dictates that retributive punishment should be restricted
to those who have consciously "chosen to break the law.""' Arguably,
those who are not to blame for their actions due to genetic causes should
not suffer commensurably for the crimes they have committed because
retributive punishment would not achieve its social purpose.
B. REHABILITATION
It is not likely that rehabilitation will be successful with genetically
predisposed criminals. This is because rehabilitative theories rest on the
presumption that the cause of criminal behavior can be corrected. The
rehabilitation theory holds that "human behavior is the product of ante-
cedent causes, that these causes can be identified, and that on this basis
therapeutic measures can be employed to effect changes in the behavior
108. FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL 66 (1981)(footnote omitted).
109. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 379 (6th ed. 1990).
110. Jonathan Glover, The Implications for Responsibility of Possible Genetic Factors in
the Explanation of Violence, in GENETICS OF CRIMINAL AND ANTISOCIAL BEHAVIOUR,
supra note 4, at 237.
111. Id. at 243.
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of the person treated.""n 2 Because this theory relies so heavily on behav-
ior modification, it is not likely that a "genetically hard-wired" criminal
would benefit from the rehabilitative measures that are currently
available.
Unfortunately, it seems that if and when proof of a genetic predisposi-
tion toward criminal or violent behavior becomes scientifically accepted,
it will likely have negative implications for "genetically programmed" vi-
olent individuals."13 According to Deborah Denno, lawyers may argue
that rehabilitative efforts for a genetically predisposed criminal defendant
would be futile since the basis for rehabilitation is the assumption that the
offender's behavior can be modified. 114 This argument could ultimately
lead to the adoption of a hypothesis that such defendants should be pe-
nalized more, not less, because they are inherently dangerous and
incurable." 5
While the potential of negating rehabilitative efforts for aggression
gene carriers exists, conversely there are also potential sentencing alter-
natives that could allow society to deal with carriers in a positive, humane
way. This could be accomplished by thinking of and treating violent be-
havior in terms of a public health model, thus dealing with the genetic
predisposition in its earliest stages of behavior manifestation or prevent-
ing manifestation altogether." 6 Dr. C. Ray Jeffery, a criminologist at
Florida State University, compared this public health-based approach to
the prevention of cancer or heart disease, when he stated, "Science [can
replace] punishment and revenge with prevention and treatment." 117
Potential sentencing alternatives under rehabilitative theories could in-
clude such alternatives as developing and prescribing drug therapies to
reverse or restore a chemical balance where a genetic deficiency has
caused an imbalance. While research on MAOA deficiency, lowered ni-
tric oxide levels, and Chromosome 11 abnormalities is still in the infancy
stage, there is evidence that MAOA and Chromosome 11 abnormalities
are linked to heightened serotonin levels.118 Serotonin-boosting drugs,
such as Prozac, have proven very successful in the treatment of chemi-
cally based conditions like bipolar depression, which suggests that seroto-
nin-reducing drugs could also be developed to ameliorate the violence-
causing effects of these genetic abnormalities." 9 Depressed nitric oxide
levels, on the other hand, are not closely associated with serotonin
levels.' 20 Scientists are hopeful, however, that drugs can be developed to
replace the missing nitric oxide.' 2 ' Although the use of these hypotheti-
112. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AusTTN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAw 24 (2d ed. 1986).
113. See Denno, supra note 62, at 254.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Angier, supra note 9, at C1, C6.
117. Id. at C6.
118. See Nelkin, supra note 1, at 2123-24.
119. See Cases et al., supra note 34, at 1763.
120. See Birch, supra note 26, at IA.
121. What Makes Males Mean-Nitric Oxide Synthase, REUTERS, Nov. 22, 1995, at 1.
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cal drug therapies is promising in the rehabilitative context, the develop-
ment of such treatments is even farther off than the scientific acceptance
of the existence of aggression genes in the first place.
Chemical castration, through the use of drugs like Depo-Provera, as a
condition of parole for sex offenders has opened the door to the use of
drugs in the criminal rehabilitative context.122 If and when the chemical
treatment of aggression genes becomes a feasible sentencing alternative,
such treatment may pose constitutional questions regarding the liberty
interest of criminal defendants in maintaining their bodily integrity.
While biological approaches to fighting violent propensities promise to
remain controversial, some criminologists believe that medical therapies
should not only be incorporated in the treatment of violent criminals, but
that such therapy should be mandatory when it becomes available. 123
C. DETERRENCE
Deterrence is an example-based sentencing theory that relies on a pre-
sumption that "would-be" criminals will steer away from criminal behav-
ior when they see the punishment received by convicted criminals. 24
Thus, in order to be effective, the punishment must outweigh the benefit
of committing the crime. An inherent problem with deterrence is that
many criminal offenders do not think rationally about their criminal be-
havior. This problem may be even more acutely realized among those
whose behavior is explained in whole or in part by genetic factors. The
utilitarian goal of reducing crime through the example of convicted of-
fenders, therefore, may not be best achieved by deterrence among those
genetically predisposed to violence and aggression.
D. INCAPACITATION
As previously discussed, there is a fear that genetic evidence may lead
juries to deliver harsher, longer sentences based on the conclusion that an
offender with a genetic disorder cannot be cured or rehabilitated and,
thus, should be incapacitated for a longer period of time.125 In light of
the difficulties such genetic predisposition evidence poses to the efficient
application or justification of the retribution, rehabilitation, and deter-
rence punishment theories, at the present time incapacitation seems the
most logical choice.
Incapacitation is justified by the belief that society must protect itself
from dangerous criminal offenders by completely eliminating the of-
fender's ability to commit crime in the future. 26 Critics of incapacitation
122. Sean Gordon, Klein Suggests Feds Examine Castration Law, CALGARY HERALD,
Sept. 19, 1996, at A3.
123. Angier, supra note 9, at C1, C6 (citing Dr. Diana Fishbein, a criminologist with the
U.S. Department of Justice).
124. LAFAVE & Sco-rr, supra note 112, at 24-25.
125. See Denno, supra note 62, at 254.
126. LAFAVE & Scorr, supra note 112, at 23-24.
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denounce this theory because of the inherent difficulty in accurately pre-
dicting who will pose a danger of continuing criminality. 127 Genetically
identifiable causation of violent behavior may, however, substantiate in-
capacitation theorists' claims that execution or life imprisonment is justi-
fied. Arguably the only way society can protect itself from persons who
lack culpability for their actions due to a genetic predisposition to violent,
impulsive behavior is through total isolation or elimination. Thus, the
presence of a genetic abnormality may ultimately end up weighing
against the criminal defendant as a risk assessment factor in sentencing
decisions since "genetics appear as a way to predict the future, helping to
anticipate ... the likelihood of recidivism.' 2 8
Trying to prove Stephen Mobley's genetic predisposition to violence in
Mobley129 was an unsuccessful attempt by the defense to mitigate punish-
ment and avoid the death penalty. While this tactic will likely be tried
again, it is at least foreseeable that juries will respond to genetic predispo-
sition information, absent effective drug therapies, by imposing longer,
harsher sentences. In turn, juries may view themselves as on a crusade to
remove the "bad apples" from the societal bushel. 130 Because incapacita-
tion raises the potential for eugenic justification of permanent incarcera-
tion, some commentators wonder if this theory will ultimately lead to the
preventative isolation of children who are suspected of being genetically
prone to criminal behavior-just as defective cars are recalled.' 3'
V. ANALOGOUS GENETIC PREDISPOSITION DEFENSES
When anticipating the future use of aggression gene information by
criminal defendants, it is helpful to survey how other biological informa-
tion has been used by criminal defendants in the past, and how it is
viewed by courts today.
A. ALCOHOLISM
Research has long shown that those with alcoholic parents are more
likely to develop alcoholism than those without alcoholic parents. 132 In
fact, a number of scientific studies have shown that alcoholism runs in
biological families with severe alcoholism affecting twenty-two percent of
127. Id. at 24.
128. Nelkin, supra note 1, at 2127.
129. Mobley v. State, 455 S.E.2d 61, 65-66 (Ga.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 377 (1995); see
supra notes 59-74 and accompanying text.
130. One possible check against such reactionary determinism is the Supreme Court's
decision in Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). The Court held that chemical
addiction, which in many cases can be tied to hereditary factors, may not be considered as
a criminal offense. Id. at 667. In a concurring opinion, Justice Douglas said, "We would
forget the teachings of the Eighth Amendment if we allowed sickness to be made a crime
and permitted sick people to be punished for being sick. This age of enlightenment cannot
tolerate such barbarous action." Id. at 678. It is certainly plausible that this line of reason-
ing could be extended to biologically linked aggression.
131. See Lawrence Taylor, The Genetic Defense, 90 Sci. DIG. 44 (1982).
132. See ROBERT PLOMIN ET AL., EHAVIORAL GENETICS: A PRIMER 352 (1980).
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the male relatives of alcoholics. 133 Adoption and twin studies have
shown that genetics play an important role in determining a person's vul-
nerability to alcoholism 134 and that a distinction exists between crimes
associated with alcoholism and those not associated with alcoholism. 135
Although scientists have yet to identify the specific gene or genes which
may predispose a person to alcoholism, 36 twin and adoption studies help
explain why showing a genetic predisposition should mitigate criminal
punishment in some cases.Courts that have heard cases in which defendants have been allowed to
admit evidence of a genetic predisposition to alcoholism have demon-
strated a judicial willingness to view genetic evidence as a mitigating fac-
tor, thus, lowering a defendant's culpability.137 Such recognition is
starkly demonstrated by comparing two similar California state disbar-
ment proceedings that involved attorneys with substance abuse problems
who were accused of misappropriating client funds.138 In In re Ewanis-
zyk, the attorney was disbarred for his unethical conduct, while the de-
fendant-attorney in Baker v. State Bar of California was able to offer
evidence of a genetic predisposition to alcoholism and as a result was
only placed on probation. 39 It is important to note, however, that in the
Baker case, the court did not view the defendant's genetic predisposition
as a mitigating factor, but rather the fact that he was not aware of his
condition and thus could not adjust his behavior accordingly. 140
The rationale of the Baker decision suggests that courts will still hold a
person with lowered culpability, due to a genetic predisposition to vio-
lence, responsible for his actions if he is aware of the condition but fails to
take appropriate steps to curb his violent, antisocial, or otherwise crimi-
nal behavior. Although there is currently no scientifically reliable way to
demonstrate that the existence of a nitric oxide or MAOA abnormality in
humans causes violent behavior, such evidence, once available, will likely
only be allowed as a mitigating factor if a criminal defendant can show:
(1) that he did not know he carried the genetic defect; or (2) that he knew
of his condition and took all reasonable steps to eliminate any effects it
might have on his behavior.14'
In Powell v. Texas,' 42 the Supreme Court considered whether alcohol-
ism was in fact a disease that should be recognized as a constitutional
133. Id.
134. Markku Linnoila et al., On the Research Front: The National Institute on Alcohol
Abuse and Alcoholism Intramural Research Program, 19 ALCOHOL HEALTH & RES.
WORLD, 60, 62 (1995).
135. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICs, supra note 16, at 952.
136. Linnoila et al., supra note 134, at 62-63.
137. See Denno, supra note 62, at 253-54.
138. Id.; compare In re Ewaniszyk, 788 P.2d 690 (Cal. 1990) with Baker v. State Bar of
Cal., 781 P.2d 1344 (Cal. 1990).
139. Denno, supra note 62, at 254.
140. Maureen P. Coffey, Note, The Genetic Defense: Excuse or Explanation?, 35 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 353, 374 (1993); Baker, 781 P.2d at 1352 n.6.
141. See Baker, 781 P.2d at 1352 n.6.
142. 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
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biological defense for excusing certain behavioral propensities.143 The
Court in Powell argued that "a constitutional biological defense would be
both difficult to administer from an evidentiary standpoint and would
pose a serious policy dilemma by opening the floodgates for excusing
compulsive behavior."'144 The majority stated,
If Leroy Powell cannot be convicted of public intoxication, it is diffi-
cult to see how a State can convict an individual for murder, if that
individual, while exhibiting normal behavior in all other respects,
suffers from a 'compulsion' to kill, which is an 'exceedingly strong
influence,' but 'not completely overpowering.' 145
The Court, however, did recognize a state's inherent authority to adopt
new criminal defenses as it sees fit in accordance with an evolving under-
standing of human behavior. 146
The reluctance of the Court to extend a constitutional biological de-
fense to alcoholism does not bode well for those who may attempt to gain
such status for an aggression gene. There is hope, however, that the argu-
ment against punishing those whose criminal behavior is caused by a he-
reditary condition they cannot change, as put forth in Justice Fortas's
dissent in the Powell case, will be adopted. Justice Fortas stated: "Its
core meaning, as agreed by authorities, is that alcoholism is caused and
maintained by something other than the moral fault of the alcoholic,
something that, to a greater or lesser extent depending upon the physio-
logical or psychological makeup and history of the individual, cannot be
controlled by him.'1 47
B. POSITRON EMISSION TOMOGRAPHY
Positron emission tomography (PET) scans allow trained technicians to
determine the existence of arachnoid cysts and metabolic imbalances in
the scanned brain, which assist in making a diagnosis of insanity.148 The
evidentiary allure of PET scans that show abnormal brain activity has
caused many courts to allow such information to be considered in sen-
tencing decisions.149 It was not until 1992, however, that a New York
court allowed a criminal defendant to use PET scan results to try to es-
tablish an insanity defense. 150 Although the court in People v. Weinstein
allowed the defendant to enter PET scan evidence, the court limited its
use. The PET scan results were allowed as diagnostic evidence of abnor-
mal brain function; however, the court refused to allow the defense to
143. Id. at 522.
144. Coffey, supra note 140, at 369.
145. Powell, 392 U.S. at 534; see also Coffey, supra note 140, at 369.
146. Coffey, supra note 140, at 370.
147. Id. at 371 (citing Powell, 392 U.S. at 561 (Fortas, J., dissenting)).
148. Denno, supra note 62, at 253; People v. Weinstein, 591 N.Y.S.2d 715, 717-18 (Crim.
Ct. 1992).
149. See Nelkin, supra note 1, at 2121.
150. Denno, supra note 62, at 253 (citing Cerisse Anderson, Brain Scan Deemed Admis-
sible at Trial: Guilty Plea Follows Insanity Defense Ruling, 208 N.Y. L.J. 1 (1992)); see
Weinstein, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 717.
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link the findings with the defendant's actual violent behavior since the
scientific community had yet to substantiate the association between the
biological abnormality and the claimed predisposition theory. 151
The evidentiary acceptance of PET scans tracks the likely evolution
that aggression genes will face in a courtroom: from consideration as a
mitigating factor at the sentencing stage to admitting evidence of a bio-
logical excuse at the trial stage, accompanied by the usual relevant scien-
tific knowledge hurdles.
C. XYY DEFENSE
In 1968, scientists discovered what they then believed was a genetic
explanation for criminal behavior when they found an extra Y chromo-
some trait shared by three percent of the male inmates at one hospital
housing the criminally insane. 152 Although this information has been
used by a small number of criminal defendants in attempts to displace
culpability, courts have generally rejected this genetic defense. 53 Cur-
rently, the theory that XYY men are predisposed to aggression or vio-
lence is not recognized either as a valid defense or as a mitigating factor
by either the medical or legal communities. 54 In one of the most cele-
brated cases in which the XYY defense was attempted, the court refused
to allow the evidence to reach the jury because "presently available medi-
cal evidence [was] unable to establish a reasonably certain causal connec-
tion between the XYY defect and [the] criminal conduct.' 55 It seems
that any possible nitric oxide or MAOA defense is currently in the XYY
stage because the findings are not yet substantive enough to prove a
causal connection between the genetic abnormalities and violent behav-
ior. In order for these new theories of genetic predisposition to criminal-
ity to gain more acceptance than the XYY defense, there must be more
research with duplicative findings that will substantiate the initial findings
of causation.
VI. CONCLUSION
The scientific and legal communities are on the edge of a new frontier
with the discovery of genetic explanations for aggressive, violent behav-
ior. Although research into nitric oxide and MAOA deficiency is still
quite new, it is certain that this information will have an impact on the
way the criminal justice system looks at, and treats, criminals carrying a
violence-causing genetic abnormality. The Mobley case is just the tip of
the iceberg, and it certainly foreshadows future attempts to admit evi-
dence of genetic defects to reduce criminal culpability. A weakness of
the current research, however, is that it does not address how the pres-
151. Anderson, supra note 150, at 2; see Weinstein, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 724-25.
152. Connor, supra note 56, at 19; see also Denno, supra note 62, at 249.
153. Denno, supra note 62, at 249.
154. Id at 249-50.
155. Id at 250 (citing State v. Roberts, 544 P.2d 754 (Wash. Ct. App. 1976)).
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ence of a nitric oxide or MAOA deficiency acts when coupled with envi-
ronmental or psychosocial stressors. Therefore, it is most likely that
when this evidence achieves the necessary scientific status under the
Daubert guidelines to be deemed admissible, it will be admitted for the
limited purpose of showing a mitigating factor at the sentencing phase of
punishment. This is the current trend among courts in using evidence of
analogous genetic or hereditary factors.
Because it is likely that evidence of genetic predispositions to violent,
antisocial behavior will ultimately be used in the courtroom, it is impor-
tant that this information be used wisely and cautiously. Unfortunately,
there is the possibility that those who favor the retribution and incapaci-
tation theories of punishment will attempt to exploit the current climate
of fear to validate "quick fix" solutions for punishing criminal offenders
by claiming that the genetic die is cast and that the only way to protect
society is either to lock affected individuals away for life or to eliminate
them from society altogether. Such an approach would be detrimental
not only to the individual offender but to society at large. It seems that
the best that can be hoped for at this point is that advancements in drug
therapies or treatments for genetically violence-prone individuals will
either parallel, or quickly follow, the scientific validation of genetic pre-
disposition evidence so that courts will have the option to use such infor-
mation in a proactive rehabilitative context.
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